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The paper builds on the premise of the constructivist theory, according to which 
ethnicity and ethnic identities are not in straightforward connection with the so-
cial groups (Brubaker). Viewed from the perspective of the events taking place 
in the 1990s, the research differentiates between two basic types of multiethnic 
areas in Croatia: (a) the areas in which the conflicts escalated to the level of 
disintegration of different forms of community life – the “conflict areas”; and 
(b) the areas in which radical conflicts were avoided and the multiethnic cohabi-
tation was to a large extent maintained – the “peace areas”. A research survey, 
whose results are presented in this paper, was conducted during October 2008 
in the local communities matching the description of the “conflict areas”, these 
being Gospić, Plaški and Pakrac, and of the “peace areas”, these being Rovinj, 
Vrbovsko and Daruvar. Apart from this, some qualitative methods of data col-
lecting have been used. The intention underlying this paper is to provide an 
answer to several essential questions concerning the processes of identification 
and maintenance of group boundaries and ethnic distance in multiethnic areas. 
On the basis of previous research, it may be assumed that these processes are 
affected by events occurring in the recent and more distant past, as well as by 
the interplay between the existing system factors and the social actors of peace 
or conflict. However, the results of the study in a certain way support the con-
structivist hypothesis on instrumentalization of ethnicity in constructing group 
boundaries and thereby in the dynamics of ethnic mobilization, ethnic conflict 
and ethnic peace.
Key words: multiethnic areas, ethnic conflict, ethnic peace, ethnic distance, 
group closure
Introduction
Different aspects of ethnic conflict have thus far been the subject of abun-
dant literature in which the cultural and structural circumstances possibly 
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generating ethnic conflict have been discussed in detail.* There are various 
examples of different communities living next to each other, even though 
divided by cultural, religious and political symbols connecting them to 
their recent or not so recent past (Kaufman, 2001: 16). Symbols frequently 
present barriers to formation of images on a common future because what 
is considered legitimate in one ethnic community lacks the same legitimacy 
in the eyes of the other community and vice versa (Wolff, 2006: 67).1 Sym-
bols, which individual ethnic communities are identified with, may also 
be understood as historical or cultural “constructs”, but their rootedness in 
collective conceptions is such that their objectivity is considered unques-
tionable.2 Structural features may also intensify the risk of ethnic conflict 
and violence, particularly under circumstances of rapid social and geopoliti-
cal changes. Absence of structural restrictions, such as democratic systems 
of social regulation or clear territorial boundaries between the states, may 
easily open the path to violence and genocidal massacres (Sekulić, Massey 
and Hodson, 2006).3 The third group of factors are those of an ideological 
and political nature. In contrast to democratic values and political prac-
tice as features of an “open” society, nationalistic exclusivism generates 
institutional solutions and stimulates dissatisfaction and ethnic conflicts. A 
specific aspect of nationalistic exclusivism is the ethnicisation of the politi-
cal scene where newly-formed political parties are structured on nearly an 
* This paper is the result of the research project “Social Integration and Collective Iden-
tity in Multiethnic Areas of Croatia”, which has been carried out with the support of the 
Ministry of Science, Education and Sports of the Republic of Croatia.
1 Examples are: Catholics and Protestants in the Northern Ireland, Jews and Palestinians 
in Israel, Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, Serbs and Croatians in Croatia, etc.
2 For instance, the myth on Kosovo in Serbian ethnic cosmology was relentlessly em-
ployed in ethno-political mobilisation of Serbs in all parts of the former Yugoslavia. 
In Croatia, the newly established government led by F. Tuđman embraced the symbols 
that inevitably brought to mind the bloody past of the Independent State of Croatia 
and the Fascist movement present there in the period of the Second World War. This 
definitively broke the line of communication with the Serbian minority in Croatia at the 
time.
3 A typical example is dissolution of the former federal states in the period following the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. In the areas of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the 
conflict broke out in places where both structural drawbacks were present. Structural 
disintegration of the Socialist system on the territory of the former Yugoslavia itself gen-
erated the conflict because the mechanisms of appeasing cultural, economic and political 
divergences and interests were no longer there. At the same time, as soon as it was stated 
that “joint life is impossible”, the issue of territorial boundaries was raised. The Memo-
randum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (often referred to as the SANU 
Memorandum) was the prominent example.
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exclusively ethnic basis.4 Finally, the fourth category of factors in which 
ethnic conflicts may be rooted are economic ones. In this sense, it is made 
impossible or difficult for the minority groups to access material resources 
in society using mechanisms such as planned weakening of modernisation 
processes, economic pacification, and establishing different forms of the 
“cultural division of labour” in specific areas where the concentration of 
the minority groups is significant.
Despite that, as D. Horowitz stated some time ago, “blood ties do not 
lead inevitably to rivers of blood” (Horowitz, 1985). In other words, ethnic 
differences or even divergences and latent conflicts need not necessarily re-
sult in an explosion of violence. Ethnic groups may live in communities not 
defined by ethnic boundaries through relatively long periods of time. And 
conflicts may be structured and regulated in different manners (Stone and 
Rizova, 2007: 386). In order to transform these differences and divergences 
into a spiral of violence, social actors must act with the aim of instigating 
and directing the conflict.5
In contrast to the situations of ethnic conflict, the questions related 
to the roots of ethnic peace have not as often been a matter of scientific 
research. Where the issues of ethnic peace are present in the analysis of 
certain social situations, they are mostly raised in the context of controlling 
ethnic conflicts and their appeasement (Schneckener, 2004; Wolff, 2004, 
2006; Tiryakian, 2004; Guelke, 2004; Olzak, 2006; Horowitz, 2001).
Vjeran Katunarić recognises several categories/forms of peace in mul-
tiethnic situations (Katunarić, 2007). Those are primarily peace-building 
post-conflict processes in which one may differentiate among peace de-
velopment stages, such as the peace-making, the peace-keeping and the 
peace-building, and finally, the democratic peace, which has to be attrib-
uted the normative idea of the culture of peace (Katunarić, 2007: 396). The 
termination of conflict entails realisation of various programs and projects 
which, in addition to significant material resources, presuppose institutional 
4 This aspect is characteristic to political parties in Croatia (as well as in the other former 
Yugoslav Republics) under the circumstances of breakdown of a one-party system. Not on-
ly were ethnic designations dominant in the names of the majority of the newly-established 
political parties, but the names of individual parties were also taken from the past eras, 
which of its own accord triggered associations with the multiethnic conflicts in the past.
5 The dramatic circumstances under which the independent Croatian state was founded 
at the beginning of the 1990s paved the way for the activities of national and local elite 
groups that significantly influenced the ethnic mobilisation processes, particularly in the 
areas already burdened with the legacy of the more recent and less recent past. Remi-
niscences from the Second World War have had a special role in mobilisation processes, 
especially in their first stage.
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transparency and responsibility. It is necessary to build up the civil sector 
under the constrictions in which not even elementary democratic precon-
ditions had existed. These objectives are difficult to realise even for the 
most influential international organisations. It is precisely on these practi-
cal problems that the democratic peace is built, based on the idea of the 
rootedness of lasting peace in the values and institutions of liberal democ-
racy. To be precise, the only way actually to overcome ethnic violence 
is through the development of the institutions of liberal democracy and a 
market economy. As Susan Olzak shows, this does not mean that the ethnic 
differences have to disappear, rather that the demands of ethnic minorities 
are presented by means of democratic institutions and civil society (Olzak, 
2006: 99). Croatian society is still quite distant from such solutions, and 
this was particularly evident during the escalation of conflict at the begin-
ning of the 1990s. This makes that much more important the research into 
the dynamics of ethnic conflict and ethnic peace in multiethnic areas of 
Croatia. Next to theoretical relevance, the answers to the questions for-
mulated initially in this text have a practical purpose, because they could 
serve as a signpost in the prevention of ethnic conflicts in social situations 
marked by an undeveloped civil society.
This paper consists of three parts. The first part outlines the theoretical 
framework for research and articulates the hypothesis. The second segment 
presents some basic results of the empirical research indicating the main 
differences and some similarities in imagining the Others in the commu-
nity (ethnic distance, group closure, categories of identification). The third 
part entails discussion on the “roots of conflict and roots of peace” within 
which certain fundamental processes are explained on the basis of the data 
acquired by means of qualitative research methods (i.e. interviews).
1. Theoretical and Hypothetical Research Framework
The theoretical horizon within which the research project is placed is basi-
cally constructivist. According to some authors (Sekulić, 2007), the con-
structivist perspective in explaining ethnicity already had its roots in We-
ber’s social action theory. Yet, the actual turning-point in interpretation of 
ethnicity, and thus of ethnic conflict, too, was achieved in the Barth’s 1969 
paper on ethnic boundaries, in which ethnicity was understood as a form 
of social action aimed at achieving certain objectives (Barth, 1969). Ethnic 
boundaries are no longer determined by culture. Quite the opposite, the 
established boundaries become the determining factor of differentiation and 
selection of cultural identity markers (Sekulić, 2007: 358). This understand-
ing emphasises the dynamic dimension of ethnic identity, which is suscep-
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tible to change, control and manipulation. Addressing these issues, Eriksen 
states that ethnicity is “essentially an aspect of a relationship, not a property 
of a group” (Eriksen, 1993: 12). The constructivist position was additionally 
radicalised by Brubaker’s thesis on ethnicity without groups. His plea for 
discarding primordialist and essentialist conceptions of ethnic conflict, as a 
conflict between the ethnic groups, was primarily motivated by aspiration 
for conceptual sharpening. At the level of ethnopolitical practice, interethnic 
conflict is presented to the very protagonists as conflict between the ethnic 
groups. For an ethnicity student and analyst, it is more efficient to think 
in the categories of ethnicisation as a political, social, cultural or psycho-
logical process in the course of which ethnicity is yet to be connected to 
“groupism”. In Brubaker’s view this means that the “group” is not consid-
ered a fundamental analytic category, and that groupism is a variable whose 
changeability depends on the context (Brubaker, 2004: 11).6 Consequently, 
ethnicity should not be understood as a substance, thing, entity or collec-
tive individual, but should rather be approached from the perspective of 
relationship, processes, political projects, and contingent events.
Described relativization of the relation between ethnicity and groupness 
inevitably leads to reviewing the concept of ethnic identity and identity in 
general. Identity, as a practical category, may have (and frequently has) stra-
tegic significance for actions of different social actors, particularly in situa-
tions where other forms of social mobilisation, such as class mobilisation, 
lose their strength. As an analytical category, identity was accepted over 
the last few decades by various theories, from interactionism to structural 
functionalism. The notion of identity was embraced by completely opposite 
theoretical perspectives on ethnicity, race and nation, such as the theories 
close to primordialism as well as the instrumentalist theories. The notion of 
identity serves the purpose of explaining the unstable, multiple, fluid and 
fragmentary nature of the contemporary Self. Analysing the heterogeneity 
of the concept of identity, Brubaker concludes that, today, the analytical 
value of the concept is seriously brought into question because the notion, 
which was originally created to denote sameness, constancy and stability, is 
acquiring opposite meanings. Instead of hopeless attempts to find a unique 
substitute for “identity”, one should unravel the knot of tangled meanings 
and divide the notion of “identity” into several less “tangled” notions such 
as self- and Other-identification, categorisation, self-understanding, social 
location, connectedness, and groupness (Brubaker, 2004: 41–48).
6 Brubaker advises of the necessity to differentiate between groups and categories. Cat-
egory is not a group. It is at best the potential basis for group-formation or “groupness” 
(Brubaker, 2004: 12).
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On the horizon of the constructivist perspective of the kind promoted 
by Brubaker, a general research hypothesis is formulated according to which 
ethnicity within the research field is understood in relationship categories, 
as a dynamic phenomenon defined with respect to established boundaries 
between the ethnic groups. Therefore, we assume that the multiethnic areas 
significantly differ in the following aspects: how the members of the com-
munity perceive themselves, how they perceive others/those different from 
them, and how they perceive the events they are involved in within the 
situations of latent and manifest conflicts.
This hypothesis expresses several specific assumptions for a given re-
search project. Social boundaries linking ethnicity to the groups have a 
powerful impact on the ideas of the community. It has to be assumed that 
this is a multidimensional process through which the communities are being 
structured, both at local and other higher levels. Undoubtedly, the differ-
ences in establishing ethnic boundaries affect not only the images of the 
community in multiethnic areas, but also ethnopolitical mobilisation and 
actions. In this context, paraphrasing B. Anderson, one could say that what 
is important is not only the way the communities are imagined, but also 
the way in which they function (Anderson, 1983). A high level of “group-
ness“ in certain social circumstances may cause creation of strong feelings 
of collective solidarity on ethnic bases, which in turn may result in expan-
sion of ethnic distance, interethnic conflicts and violence. Likewise, “softer” 
and more porous ethnic boundaries may cause weak connections between 
ethnicity and “groupness”, as well as a lack of ethnopolitical mobilisation 
in other areas. Where there are ethnic conflicts and violence in its surround-
ings, the future of a community may heavily depend on the local communi-
ty members’ perception of “Others”, their self-identification and dimensions 
of belonging to which they attribute greater or lesser importance.
2.  Imagining the Others and Self-identification in Multiethnic 
Areas – Some Empirical Data
This paper is founded on the empirical research carried out through Octo-
ber and November 2008, covering a series of multiethnic areas in Croatia. 
Our previous investigations indicate that the answers to questions concern-
ing multiethnic conflict and, in particular, multiethnic peace, cannot be 
looked for on the national level exclusively (Banovac, 1998; Katunarić and 
Banovac, 2004; Boneta and Banovac, 2007). Institutional solutions and ac-
tions of active participants at the national, i.e. the state level, are frequently 
concealed under the veil of higher “national interests”, they fail to reach 
beyond the declaratory statements of political leaders, and they often mis-
represent the actual state of the problems at local levels. For these reasons, 
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the answer to the question as to why ethnic-national mobilisation in certain 
communities occurs in a radical manner, while in other communities it 
comes about with some difficulty or not at all, should be sought for at the 
same place it is posed – at the local levels. For obvious reasons that may 
be found in the recent past, the research underlying this paper focuses on 
Croatian and Serbian relations. Nevertheless, the sample includes the com-
munities in which other minority groups make up a considerable portion 
(Italians in Rovinj, Czechs in Daruvar).
The scope of the research includes questionnaires filled in by 809 
persons from six towns/municipalities in Croatia: Gospić, Plaški, Pakrac, 
Vrbovsko, Rovinj and Daruvar.7 The first three of the listed towns/munici-
palities (Gospić, Plaški and Pakrac) have seen events of war and ethnic 
conflict, not only in the more recent times but also further back into the 
past. These are the areas where, in the course of the last century and par-
ticularly in the early 1990s, radical conflicts fed on the ethnic-national dif-
ferences, and reintegration processes developed in contradictory ways. The 
latter three towns (Vrbovsko, Rovinj and Daruvar) represent the multiethnic 
areas in which either the interethnic peace was preserved throughout the 
1990s (Rovinj and Vrbovsko), or, despite the warfare in the immediate 
vicinity and social disturbances, coexistence was maintained in the local 
community (Daruvar).8 The survey was performed in the form of structured 
interviews by a trained team of students.
Prior to distributing questionnaires, several interviews were made with 
the representatives of the “expert groups”, i.e. the individuals belonging to 
political and intellectual circles who were immediate protagonists of the 
dramatic circumstances in which the Croatian state was established in the 
early 1990s, as well as one of the key factors in the reconstruction of ethnic 
peace and reintegration in the post-conflict period. These dialogues had a 
two-fold purpose. Firstly, they served as the bases for outlining the hypoth-
esis of the research and directing the research to the actual living condi-
tions in the local communities. Secondly, the interviews were planned as a 
supporting source, i.e. a kind of “oral history” of the interethnic relations, 
thus facilitating the interpretation of the collected data. To this purpose the 
structure of the interviews was basically homologous to the structure of the 
questionnaire.
7 See the appendix to this paper.
8 The sample design included three steps. In the first step, the six localities/municipalities 
have been chosen on the basis of their demography and peace/conflict records in the first 
half of the 1990s. In the second step, the quotas of examinees were established on the basis 
of the demographic structure (including gender and age) of the areas. In the third step, a 
random choice was made out of quotas of examinees.
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Different indicators were used in the study, aimed at finding the answer 
to the question as to how the people see life in their community. Due to 
the limited volume of this paper, only some of the main indicators related 
to the assumptions mentioned in the introduction will be presented here. 
These are: ethnic distance, opinions of the “Others”, and self-identification 
processes. In accordance with the assumptions referred to in the introduc-
tory part of this paper, the analysis of the data focuses on the differences 
between conflict areas and peace areas.
2.1.  Interethnic Relations, Ethnic Distance and Perception
of the “Others”
Ethnic distance is measured by means of a modified Bogardus social dis-
tance scale.9 The acceptability of relations towards the ethnic groups was 
examined, it being assumed that they enter into everyday interaction in 
the selected towns/municipalities. These groups are: Albanians, Bosniacs, 
Croatians, Roma, Slovenians, Serbs, and Italians. Table 1 shows the basic 
distributions of answers for the peace area and the conflict area. For the 
purpose of easy reference, Table 1 shows only the affirmative answers to 
the question: “If you were to decide on the relation towards the mentioned 
groups, which groups would you accept as …?” The basic distribution of 
answers to the posed questions indicates several general tendencies. There 
are huge differences in all categories of relations between the “conflict 
areas” and the “peace enclaves” when it comes to accepting different eth-
nic groups. The answers distribution rather clearly shows that the ethnic 
boundaries are more clearly and “sharply” drawn in the conflict areas than 
in the peace areas.
Not surprisingly, the more formal the relations and the lesser the “emo-
tional tension”, the more porous the social boundaries. The exception is with 
regard to the question of acceptance of members of the minority groups in 
“leading functions in economic and political life”. In these relations, the 
ethnic distance is slightly less than in the case of “entering a marital rela-
tion” (accepting one of them as a potential spouse). Although social ostra-
cism, which is recognisable in the data contained in the last column,10 is 
relatively low, it has to be pointed out that one of ten persons questioned 
9 The most significant change in relation to the original Bogardus scale is in an additional 
“element”, which concerns the acceptability of representatives of individual ethnic groups 
holding the leading functions in the political and economic sphere.
10 The element was phrased in the following manner: “they have to be forbidden to stay in 
Croatia”. As opposed to other questions and answers, the affirmative answer in this case, 
meant the negative attitude of the persons answering the question.
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in the conflict areas believes that members of the Serbian ethnic national 
group should be forbidden to stay in Croatia. Interestingly, Slovenians are 
positioned in the second place and Roma in the third, with more than twice 
as less frequency of affirmative answers than in case of Serbians. Although 
frequency of such answers is not high, it indicates two possible criteria for 
intolerance towards the “Others”. The first is of a political nature, and the 
other is based on cultural distance. Finally, it has to be borne in mind that 
the sample consisted of 76% persons who declared themselves as ethnic 
Croatians, meaning that they set the general “tenor” of the distribution as 
a whole, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Acceptability of relations to members of different ethnic groups 
(in %)
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Albanians Peace 72.3 71.8 77.3 76.3 61.8 52.8 92.9  1.4
 Conflict 55.3 54.8 62.5 57.9 46.0 40.3 76.0  3.9
Bosniacs Peace 81.8 82.2 84.6 84.4 68.0 61.6 94.1  0.7
 Conflict 62.8 65.1 71.3 65.9 51.7 45.7 79.8  2.6
Croats Peace 98.6 98.1 98.3 98.3 97.9 96.7 97.9  0.5
 Conflict 95.3 96.4 95.6 94.8 93.5 94.8 92.8  1.3
Roma Peace 70.9 71.3 76.5 75.8 61.1 51.4 92.4  1.2
 Conflict 51.7 51.9 59.9 56.3 44.4 37.2 74.9  4.4
Slovenians Peace 79.6 79.9 82.5 82.7 68.2 63.7 93.8  0.7
 Conflict 56.8 55.6 64.6 61.5 51.9 42.1 78.6  4.7
Serbs Peace 77.0 77.0 81.5 79.9 65.9 62.3 93.1  2.4
 Conflict 54.3 54.8 64.1 58.9 48.3 41.3 76.0 10.6
Italians Peace 88.9 87.4 88.4 87.7 75.6 72.7 96.0  0.5
 Conflict 67.4 66.1 71.1 68.7 54.0 48.8 86.6  1.6
When speaking of ethnic distance in the studied areas, it has to be 
pointed out that the peace areas and the conflict areas should not be un-
derstood as fully homogenous categories. This is best illustrated by the 
following graphical representation of the results of the analysis of variances 
in ethnic distance for Croatians regarding the “entering a marital relation” 
variable, distributed by towns/municipalities. For the purpose of easy refer-
ence, only the data for four ethnic groups are mentioned, these being Serbs, 
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Albanians, Bosniacs and Roma. A higher index value shows higher distance 
from individual ethnic groups.
Chart 1. Social distance of Croatians by the locations – refusal to enter 
marital relations
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
Albanians Bosniacs Roma Serbs
Vrbovsko
Rovinj
Daruvar
Plaški
Pakrac
Gospić
Wilks lambda = .90460, F (20,2014,1) = 3.0910, p = .00000
Difference between peace areas (Vrbovsko, Rovinj and Daruvar) and 
conflict areas (Plaški, Pakrac, Gospić) are evident and considerable in the 
statistical sense. The presented distribution suggests several important as-
pects. Differences in ethnic distance are the most overt in relations between 
Croatians and Serbs. Differences between peace areas and conflict areas 
are lesser when it comes to groups such as Albanians and Roma, who dif-
fer from the majority group even more in some cultural aspects (language, 
religion). The most tolerant of all studied areas is the town of Vrbovsko 
in the Gorski Kotar region. This is the environment in which members of 
Serbian ethnic groups make up one third of the population, according to the 
1991 census.11 To date, there have been almost no changes in the structure 
of the population. By far the most intolerant environment is in Gospić, the 
centre of the Lika region.12
11 According to the data in the 2001 census, 6,047 persons lived in the area of Vrbovsko, 
57.25% of whom being Croatian and 36.23% Serbs.
12 Prior to the war conflict in the early 1990s, the Gospić Serbian minority in the area 
was somewhat smaller than a third of the total population. Today, their share is lower 
than 5%.
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Despite quite clear differences in the ethnic distance between the peace 
areas and the conflict areas, it would be erroneous to conclude that this is 
the only variable to which the establishment of social boundaries is con-
nected. A statistical technique of regression analysis was used for the pur-
pose of determining the predictors of individual ethnic distance variables. 
Ethnic distance variables are used as dependant variables, while the social 
attributes (gender, age, marital status, education) and peace/conflict area, 
political orientation (left, centre, right) and religiosity were used as inde-
pendent variables. The results for the “entering a marital relation” variable 
are presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Predictor variables for “Entering a marital relation”
Spouse – Serbs Beta Sig. Spouse – Roma Beta Sig.
Political orientation .191543 .000 Political orientation .121786 .002
Religiosity –.145101 .000 Religiosity –.105669 .007
Peace/Conflict .133978 .000 Peace/Conflict .086897 .025
R square .139 R square .083
Spouse – Bosniacs Beta Sig. Spouse – Albanians Beta Sig.
Political orientation .151884 .000 Religiosity –.136413 .000
Sex .112790 .002 Political orientation .113437 .004
Religiosity –.101835 .001 Age –.107063 .000
Peace/Conflict .098394 .010 Peace/Conflict .069906 –.088
R square .098 R square .085
The variables which appear in addition to the differentiation between 
the peace and conflict areas, and which serve as the main predictors of 
ethnic distance are political orientation and religiosity. Relatedness be-
tween the political orientations13 and ethnic distance is confirmed in other 
studies carried out in Croatia (Šiber, 1997; Banovac and Boneta, 2006). 
Although the division to the left, central and right political orientation are 
questionable to some extent nowadays, the right, i.e. conservative political 
option is linked to traditionalist values, ethnocentrism and more xenophobic 
viewpoints. During the conflicts in the 1990s, such points of view were 
often publicly promoted not only by some of the leaders of the right-wing 
13 Political orientations were examined on the basis of the so-called semantic differential 
scale where the persons questioned may defined their conceptual-political position in the 
sense of belonging to the left or right political wing or centre. Examined persons posi-
tioned themselves on the left-right continuum of political orientation with seven degrees. 
For the reason of statistical correctness, three categories left and three categories right of 
centre were classified as left and right, respectively.
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political parties, but also by those holding positions in the Croatian govern-
ment.
The other predictor variable of ethnic distance is religiosity. The neg-
ative value of the beta coefficient means that in certain cases, a higher 
level of religiosity is related to a lower level of acceptance of ethnic 
diversity. This phenomenon has also been identified in the earlier studies 
conducted in Croatia and other countries (Sekulić, 2004; Norris and In-
glehart, 2004). In multiethnic areas in Croatia, this sort of relatedness has 
specific weight given the frequent overlap of ethnic and religious bounda-
ries among social groups.14 In two of the mentioned cases, age and gender 
are predictor variables. When it comes to establishing marital bonds with 
the Bosniac group, it seems that women are less susceptible to prejudices 
than men. On the other hand, older rather than younger persons included 
in the sample tend to demonstrate somewhat deeper prejudices in relation 
to Albanians.
2.2.  Moral Opinions on Others – Questions of the Group 
Openness/Closure
Besides ethnic distance, the degree of closeness towards the other groups 
has been measured using an additional instrument. As opposed to the cat-
egories of ethnic distance which contain different presupposed relations, 
another instrument measuring social boundaries contains seven categories 
for which we have assumed that they have certain moral-value signifi-
cance for the examinees. The question was phrased as follows: “Would 
you agree with the statement that persons belonging to different ethnic 
groups are equally diligent, honest, religious, tolerant, refined, friendly, 
and peace-loving?”. The replies “I do not agree” are shown in the graph 
below.
The chart clearly shows the differences in the level of social closure in 
the areas of peace and the areas of conflict. The highest degree of social 
closure for the members of other groups is present for the categories of 
“religiousness”, “tolerance” and “peacefulness”. Such distribution of replies 
leads to the conclusion that in the monitored areas, and particularly in those 
where the conflict relations are prevailing, religion is one of the main fac-
tors of ethnic closure.
14 This is particularly true when it comes to Croatians, Serbs and Bosniacs who are tradi-
tionally identified as Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims, respectively.
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Chart 2. Non-agreement with the statement that the members of different 
ethnic groups are equally diligent, honest, religious, tolerant, refined, 
friendly, and peace-loving (in %)
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In the analysis that followed, a composite variable (index) of group 
openness/closure was defined in such a way that each affirmative answer to 
an individual element was assigned points. Consequently, the higher values 
in the further analysis stand for a higher degree of group openness. Relat-
edness of the composite variable of group openness was tested by analysis 
of variance as a statistical procedure. Similarly as in the case of ethnic dis-
tance, statistically significant relatedness was established with the variables: 
“town/municipality”, “religiosity” and “political orientation”.
Chart 3. Group openness and town/municipality
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Current effect: F (5,803) = 4.6788, p = .00032
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“Group openness” as distributed by the location reflects in more de-
tails the division into the conflict areas and the peace enclaves. In this 
case too, Vrbovsko is confirmed to be the most open environment in 
terms of interethnic relations. Plaški is the “most closed” of all the ex-
amined social environments. We may presume that one of the reasons for 
the latter results is the fact that the wider municipal area of Plaški was 
completely demographically devastated during 1990s. Out of 2,271 inhab-
itants who were living in that local community in 1991, no more than 92 
remained there following the decisive Croatian military actions in 1995. 
In the subsequent period, predominantly Croatian refugees from Bosnia-
Herzegovina have settled there, and part of the refugee Serbs returned. 
The traditional community was practically “erased” which is certainly the 
source of problems in communication between the groups and individu-
als who live in this area at present; they often perceive each other as 
strangers.
The variables “religiosity” and “political orientation” are related to 
the composite variable of group openness in a similar way as in the case 
of ethnic distance. The most closed group is composed of “convinced 
worshippers”, i.e. those who are the most radical religious believers. The 
other extreme belongs to the most radical opponents to religion. The 
remaining groups are relatively equally distributed between these ex-
tremes.
Chart 4. Group openness and religiosity
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Chart 5. Group openness and political orientations
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The relation between the “group openness” and political orientation 
of respondents confirms that those persons who declare themselves as be-
longing to the left orientation are more open to the “Others” than those 
who declare themselves as members of the right-wing or political centre. 
Nevertheless, on the radical positions on both the left and right wing, the 
tendency is towards lessening of moral tolerance for the “Others”.
2.3. Identification Processes
Life in a community inevitably involves the individual’s feeling of affilia-
tion with the social group that is understood as such community. The im-
age of the community in that sense presupposes relatedness and interaction 
between individuals, as well as identification with the different structural 
elements of the group. In this context, the identification process is realised 
through the activity of an individual within certain social structures, which 
can be understood as the structures of common life with the Others (Cifrić 
and Nikodem, 2006: 175). For these reasons, the answers to the question 
on imagining different communities are inconceivable without studying 
the identification processes. Starting from the constructivist assumption on 
multidimensionality and fluidity of identification processes in contempo-
rary societies, identification processes have been studied through different 
dimensions.
The study is based on the assumption on relatedness of identification 
processes and ethnic conflict or ethnic peace. To be precise, we sought the 
answer to the question as to whether it is possible to establish the differ-
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ences in certain dimensions of identification processes in the conflict areas 
and peace enclaves. The instrument was used in the survey, which con-
tained 15 categories for which we have assumed that, taken together, they 
include the most important aspects of identification processes. The results 
of the analysis of variance using the predictor variable peace/conflict are 
shown in the table below.
Table 3. Identification categories (How much significance do you attribute 
to the following forms of belonging and affiliation?)15
Peace Conflict
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
Family 3.66 .033 3.62 .034
Homeland 3.23 .042 3.26 .044
Croatia 3.10 .041 3.22 .043
Region 3.06 .046 2.97 .048
Town 3.02 .047 2.89 .049
Culture 2.88 .042 2.95 .044
District 2.88 .049 2.84 .052
Language 2.69 .050 2.81 .052
Nation 2.57 .049 2.98 .051
Profession 2.42 .050 2.29 .052
Gender 2.38 .053 2.46 .055
Church 2.37 .049 2.86 .052
Generation 2.30 .050 2.35 .053
Europe 2.27 .047 2.30 .049
Political party 1.61 .041 1.86 .043
N 413 378
Although there is a statistically significant correlation between the 
identification categories on one side and the peace/conflict variable on the 
other, more careful analysis of the mentioned data demonstrates that dif-
ferences in most of the categories are actually minimal. In fact, there are 
only two categories in which the identification processes in the conflict 
areas and the peace areas differ to a great extent. These are belonging to 
a nation and belonging to a church (i.e. religion). The question that may 
be posed in this context is: Is it possible to explain the dynamics of ethnic 
conflict and ethnic peace in the relevant areas solely on the basis of these 
15 The surveyed persons were requested to assign points from 1 (completely unimportant) 
to 4 (very important) to rate the significance they attributed to each of the selected cat-
egories.
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differences? This is all the more so, since even the examined persons resid-
ing in the conflict areas tend to attribute greater importance to some other 
identification categories (family, homeland, national and regional/local ter-
ritorial affiliation) instead of religious and ethnic affiliation. Attempting to 
find the answer to the posed question, we have carried out additional data 
processing that consisted of two stages. Firstly, factor analysis was applied 
to the identification categories, and secondly, the obtained factors (compos-
ite variables) were included in the regression analysis. Factor analysis of 
the main components generated 4 factors, explaining somewhat less than 
64% of the total variance.
The first factor (territorial identification) consists of five variables and 
includes: belonging to a town, to a region, to a quarter/village, Croatia 
and homeland.
The second factor (primordial identification) consists also of five var-
iables and involves the feelings of belonging to a national group, to a 
church (religion), to a national culture, a feeling of affiliation to mother 
tongue and family.
The third factor (socio-professional identification) entails three vari-
ables: generational affiliation, gender, and a feeling of professional affili-
ation. The “tenor” to this factor is given by the first two elements, which 
have the highest factor saturation.
The fourth factor (political identification) includes two variables: po-
litical party affiliation and belonging to the European social space.
The obtained factors were included in the regression analysis as de-
pendent variables, while the variables from the previous analysis (peace/
conflict, gender, age, education, political orientation, religiosity) were used 
as predictor variables. The results of the regression analysis are shown in 
the table below.
Table 4. Factors of identification – regression analysis results
F1 – Territorial id. Beta Sig.  F3 – Socio-professional id. Beta Sig.
Age .188 0  Age –.102 .042
Education –.097 .011  Gender –.038 .039
R square = .068  R square = .017
F2 – Primordial id. Beta Sig.  F4 – Political id. Beta Sig.
Religiosity –.33 0  Education .105 .008
Pol. orientation .136 0  Peace/Conflict .102 .012
Peace/Conflict .091 .013  R square = .027
R square = .192
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Results of the regression analysis demonstrate that identification 
processes are barely related to the division into the peace areas and the 
conflict areas. In two cases (territorial and socio-professional identifica-
tion) there is no statistically significant correlation to the peace/conflict 
variable. In the other two cases there is relatedness to the peace/conflict 
variable, but it is considerably weaker in the former case (primordial 
identification) than the correlation to the latter two predictors (religiosity 
and political orientation), and in the other case (political identification) 
the multiple correlation coefficient (R square) is low and explains less 
than 3% of variance.
We may conclude that the multiple regression analysis confirms the 
formerly stated hypothesis on the questionable relatedness between the 
peace/conflict variable on the one hand, and identification processes on 
the other. This is fully evident in the case of identification processes 
which the surveyed persons consider highly important, being those con-
tained in the territorial identification factor. In this context, the follow-
ing question may be posed: what determines the dynamic processes of 
ethnic conflict and peace if they are not clearly related to processes of 
identification? This is even more so, given that the examination of ethnic 
distance suggests fairly clear division between conflict areas and those in 
which ethnic peace was preserved. In order to be able to explain at least 
partially the dynamics and roots of peace and conflict in multiethnic com-
munities, one should use qualitative methods and the “oral” history of the 
respective communities, because an official and more objective one has 
not yet been written.
3.  Roots of Conflict and Roots of Peace in Multiethnic Areas 
in Croatia
Dilemmas and divergences suggested by the results of the empirical re-
search may to some extent be explained on the basis of information ob-
tained through the “oral history” method used in the study. These are the 
previously mentioned interviews whose analysis sheds a somewhat differ-
ent light on the results obtained on the basis of quantitative methods. Thus 
far, the work within the research project has included structured interviews 
with two targeted groups. The first group was made of persons who can be 
defined as the expert group on the national level. This group consisted of 
individuals who, in addition to having knowledge of the general problems 
related to interethnic relations in Croatia, were the immediate partakers in 
the events occurring in the early 1990s and played key roles in different 
areas of social life, both in the course of the most violent conflict and 
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during the reconstruction of ethnic peace.16 All interviewed persons had 
practical experience related to multiethnic relationships, while the majority 
of them also had direct biographical relations to the areas included in the 
study. The second group of interviewed persons consisted of members of 
the local communities. These persons were selected for interviews within 
the two communities in which the questionnaires were also distributed. 
These are Vrbovsko, as a typical peaceful area, and Plaški, as a conflict 
area that was fully demographically devastated in the 1990s. The final sec-
tion of this paper offers some of the indications obtained on the basis of 
interviews, which further explain the results of the study using the ques-
tionnaires. Similar questions were posed, both to the expert groups and to 
the local inhabitants.
The question as to why peace was preserved in some areas, while this 
did not happen in other areas, was answered in a way that indicates the 
complexity of conflict dynamics and especially, of the dynamics and the 
roots of ethnic peace. One interviewed person, who lived in the area which 
saw no conflicts, explained that the ethnic distances in the territory of Vr-
bovsko were nonexistent prior to the 1990s. In his own words, the mem-
bers of the local community were unaware of “who was who”. Under such 
circumstances, ethnic mobilisation was quite difficult, but it was possible 
from the very beginning clearly to tell apart the actors of conflict from the 
actors of peace. In his view, the main player of conflict in this area was the 
former Yugoslav Army which, following the short war episode in Slovenia, 
withdrew to the borders of the so-called “truncated Yugoslavia”. Given that 
mobilisation of the local Serbs and initiation of the conflict “from the in-
side” were not possible, the “methodology of rebellion” was used similarly 
as in other multiethnic areas with a greater number of Serbs inhabitants. 
The basic strategy was sending external instructors (usually retired mem-
bers of the former Yugoslav Army and secret services) with the task to 
spread fear and panic among the Serbs, and win them over to the rebels’ 
side.17 Subsequently, they organised mass gatherings with explicit Serbian 
16 In sum, six national interlocutors were selected for the interviews: an expert on Croatian-
Serbian history; a highly positioned advisor of the President of Croatia; the former head of 
a major NGO for human rights and a scholar; a political leader of the Croatian Serbs, also 
a scholar; another political leader of the Croatian Serbs (belonging to an opposite political 
camp in the Serbian community), who runs a broad network of Serbian organizations in 
Croatia; and, finally, a former Croatian Minister of the Interior in the early 1990s, who 
played a key role in successful peace-talks with local Serbs in an ethnically mixed area 
in the Gorski Kotar region.
17 The interlocutor stated that in the first stage only a few individuals joined the rebellions 
(a local innkeeper and some retailers), motivated by the promised material benefit rather 
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nationalistic and Chetnik symbolics.18 It was not before these events took 
place that the change happened in the minds of the targeted people and 
they began to take part in the rebellion. This was followed by denying 
legitimacy to the democratically elected local governments under pressure 
of organised demonstrations in some places, as well as by militarising the 
newly-founded institutions and turning them into “crisis headquarters”. The 
final mobilisation stage in preparing the rebellion was distribution of weap-
ons to the local Serbian inhabitants, which was done by the former Yugo-
slav Army.19 This was “the point of no return” because it was followed by 
the reaction of the newly-established Croatian government, what in turn 
brought about the escalation of the conflict in most of these cases. The 
wider area of Vrbovsko and some neighbouring municipalities in Gorski 
Kotar were actually the isolated cases of the described arming of local 
people with peaceful epilogues.20
According to the opinion of all the interviewed persons (both the na-
tional experts and the local people), ethnic peace in that area was kept due 
exclusively to the mediating activities of individuals who knew well these 
communities, had grown up there, or enjoyed the trust of the local peo-
ple for other reasons.21 The importance of the role of such actors, as well 
as the risk they were exposed to, are best illustrated by the examples of 
the places where individuals who took the role of ethnic peace mediators 
were physically liquidated (i.e. the chief of police in Osijek, and mayor 
in Vrginmost, the Kordun region). It was only upon their removal that the 
than the extreme ethnic and nationalist identification. He pointed out that people who were 
sent from outside were not concerned with the fact that these local Serbs might be injured 
or killed in the conflicts.
18 The impact of mobilisation in the neighbouring area of Vrbovsko was spread by means 
of the gathering organised on 4 March 1990 on the mountain called Petrova Gora. The 
protests were organised under the name of “gatherings of truth”, and the majority of the 
participants were brought in by busses from Serbia, Bosnia and other parts of Croatia in 
which the insurgency had already spread its roots.
19 The persons interviewed state that Serbs living in the wider areas of Vrbovsko were 
distributed some 3,000 pieces of weaponry.
20 These peace enclaves located immediately along the areas involved in warfare, should 
not be confused with other areas which were further from the hostilities and in which 
interethnic peace was preserved, such as those in Istria.
21 Two interviewed persons belonging to the group of national experts were born in these 
areas and were directly involved in prevention of conflict. They both lived in Zagreb in 
the 1990s and had connections to the structures in the newly-established government. One 
of them declared his ethnicity to be Croatian and was minister of internal affairs in the 
first Croatian government at that time. The other is an ethnic Serb, also indirectly related 
to the structures of Croatian government to the present day.
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engineers of ethnic violence could have succeeded in fulfilling their mis-
sion in these areas.
The second element affecting strengthening of ethnic boundaries was 
the dissolution of patriarchal cultural patterns. An interviewed person, a 
former activist of the Croatian Helsinki Committee, specifically empha-
sised the significance of neighbourhood relations as an important inte-
gration mechanism at the local level. He pointed out that the war in the 
1990s was the first war in these territories in which “one was fighting 
one’s neighbour”. This did not occur in the former wars, at least not as 
systematically and as principally as in the first half of the 1990s. In the 
light of this circumstance, the activities of the peace mediators were merely 
focused on preserving the trust and common values within the multiethnic 
communities, despite external pressures.
The third element mentioned by the majority of interviewed persons 
to be an important basis for explaining the conflict and the peace were the 
events in the Second World War.22 Nearly all agreed that both positive and 
negative reminiscences from that period played an important role in the 
1990s conflict and in the subsequent attempts to reconstruct the communi-
ties. Particularly important was the symbolic meaning the Second World 
War had for the relations between Croatians and Serbs in the 1990s. It is a 
well-known fact that in that period, both Croatian and Serbian nationalists 
excessively used the Ustashi and Chetnik iconography from the Second 
World War. At the level of everyday life, this was a very efficient method 
of drawing ethnic boundaries and partitions. Avoiding such iconography 
could lead to the opposite, peaceful outcome. One interviewed person from 
Vrbovsko told us that from the time that the first provocations came from 
outside the local communities, ethnically mixed police squads, made up of 
local Croatians and Serbs, and patrolled the streets. They wore old Yugo-
slav uniforms without any national or other symbols.23
There was a somewhat different situation in Istria (including the town 
of Rovinj) where the regionalist alternative played an important role in 
keeping the interethnic peace. This regional alternative stood firmly against 
the nationalistic politics of the central government in the most critical pe-
22 One interviewed person belonging to the expert group said that the situation was much 
better in the multiethnic areas populated by Serbs who joined the Partisan movement in 
the Second World War, than in those where they joined Chetnik paramilitary forces in 
larger numbers.
23 A similar story was told by our partners in the course of researching the Bosnian town 
of Tuzla in 2003. For the same reasons, the police force in Tuzla wore the Tuzla coat-of-
arms on their uniforms instead of any national symbols.
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riod.24 Along with other specificities, such as the relative remoteness from 
the areas of war operations, regionalism was an important stability factor in 
the functioning of the institutional aspects of social life, in keeping cross-
border co-operation, and in maintaining relations with certain European 
Union bodies.25
Despite the serious attempts made, peace mediators’ tactics failed in 
the neighbouring areas. Under the circumstances of war, Plaški, similarly to 
some other places populated by Serbs, remains demographically devastated 
after the Croatian military actions that put down the Serbian rebellion in 
1995. Under these circumstances, in Plaški as well as in other areas, the de-
mographic “filling in” was organised, by encouraging the settling of ethnic 
Croatians expatriated from the areas of former Yugoslavia, predominantly 
from Bosnia-Herzegovina.26 We were told by the persons we interviewed 
at the local and national levels that, following the Croatian military opera-
tions, there were no multiethnic conflicts in Plaški. As opposed to some 
other conflict areas,27 Plaški is going through a relatively peaceful reinte-
gration process, although it is affected by many social and economic prob-
lems (e.g. lack of investments, high unemployment rate). The interviewed 
local interlocutor of Serbian ethnic affiliation pointed out that multiethnic 
conflicts cannot be resolved merely by economic reconstruction. One of the 
main problems related to reintegration is demographic structure. In the case 
of ethnic Serbs particularly, the share of elderly people in the population 
is increasingly growing. As in the other conflict areas, people returning to 
Plaški are mainly of advanced age. He also pointed out that Serbs are still 
deprived of certain fundamental rights; for instance, Serbian children are 
facing continuous impediment to education in their mother tongue, while 
members of the Serbian ethnic group cannot access the key positions in the 
local self-government. The inhabitants of Plaški who were interviewed, ir-
respective of their ethnic affiliation, still claim that there is tolerance at the 
level of everyday life and no visible segregation between the ethnic groups. 
In spite of that, Plaški fits the conventional pattern of disintegrated com-
24 The Istrian Democratic Assembly was founded as a regional political party in 1990. As 
of 1991 to the present day, the IDA (the Croatian acronym is IDS) enjoys majority support 
in Istria in all elections.
25 Already in 1995, Istria was included in the organisations bringing together the European 
regions.
26 Today, the share of ethnic Serbs and ethnic Croatians in Plaški is approximately the 
same. The wider areas surrounding Plaški are also interesting because some of the nearby 
villages have been populated by a group of fifty or so members of the Hare Krishna cult. 
One of the interviewed persons belonged to that cult.
27 These are primarily the areas of northern Dalmatia.
 Boris Banovac: Imagining the Others..., Revija za sociologiju 40[39] (2009), 3-4: 183–209
 205
munities, which is both recognisable in the comments of the interviewed 
persons and confirmed by other studies. This pattern is reintegration which 
is, in the best case, an “endurable process” (Mesić and Bagić, 2007). Ac-
cording to the prevailing opinion, the reconstruction of communities that 
existed in the conflict areas before the war is simply not viable. In the light 
of this conclusion, one should view the data of the survey study, which 
show a high degree of group closure in places such as Plaški, despite the 
perceived tolerance present in the interviews.
Concluding Remarks
The results of the study carried out in the multiethnic areas in Croatia 
confirm the hypothesis on the dynamic character of ethnicity, which was 
formulated in the introduction to this paper. Comparative analysis between 
the peace areas and the conflict areas shows considerable differences in 
ethnic distance between the former and the latter. Significantly larger ethnic 
distance is measured in the areas in which the conflicts escalated in the 
1990s, than in the areas where there were no multiethnic conflicts (Vr-
bovsko and Rovinj) or where these conflicts had limited impact (Daruvar). 
In this context, one should bear in mind the quite clear difference between 
the places in both sub-samples. Vrbovsko has been revealed as the most 
tolerant place within the peace area, whereas Gospić is the place with the 
largest ethnic distance towards all groups included in the study. Neverthe-
less, it is important to note that the issues of ethnic distance are related 
to two predictor variables, being religiosity (more religious people have a 
larger distance towards the “Others”) and political orientation (the right-
wing oriented have a larger distance towards the “Others”). In analysing 
identification processes, not even the approximate differentiation between 
the peace areas and the conflict areas can be determined. Testing different 
aspects of social affiliation reveals certain differences only in respect to the 
importance of religious and ethnic affiliations. However, the majority of 
persons included in the study, equally in the peace areas and in the conflict 
areas, do not attribute the highest importance to these identification dimen-
sions. In that sense, the results of the study support in a certain way the 
constructivist hypothesis on instrumentalization of ethnicity in constructing 
group boundaries and indicate that the differences in ethnic distance and 
reasons for group closure have truly complex roots.
Qualitative analysis of the interviews carried out within the study 
points to several factors that can be understood as roots of ethnic con-
flict and ethnic peace in the studied areas. First and foremost is the 
activity of the peace actors on the one side, and the conflict actors on 
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the other. Here, the relations, coalitions, and conflicts between political 
elites have proven to be particularly important on the local level and in 
the political centres. Additionally, initiatives and individual actions have 
huge importance, especially under the circumstances of insufficient insti-
tutionalisation of social life. The second group of factors is composed of 
cultural patterns and traditional integration mechanisms in local commu-
nities (e.g. neighbour relations). Their disruption opens the disintegration 
process in the local community. The third category of factors is made up 
of historical and symbolic aspects. In this context, historical memories 
and “debts” from the past (such as those from the time of the Second 
World War) can encourage conflicts in certain cases, or lead to peace in 
other situations.
In the end, we may reiterate that the studies conducted until now have 
analysed the mentioned factors mainly within the attempt to explain ethnic 
conflicts, whilst hardly ever with the aim to explain ethnic peace and ab-
sence of conflict. This is not surprising given that the areas in which the 
multiethnic peace is preserved usually do not pose problems to anyone, 
save of course to the conflict actors. Is it not time to raise more frequently, 
besides the question: “What is the cause of multiethnic conflict?” the ques-
tion of: “Why is multiethnic peace preserved in some areas?”
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APPENDIX – The Research Areas
Rovinj is a city situated on the north Adriatic Sea. It is located on the western 
coast of the Istrian Peninsula and is a popular tourist resort and active fishing 
port. A Romance language was once widely spoken in this part of Istria and is 
still spoken today by part of the residents. Rovinj is a bilingual town: the official 
name is Rovinj/Rovigno. There are 13,562 people living in Rovinj. 76.31% are 
Croats. Ethnic minorities include 16% Italians, 3.51% Serbs, 2.37% Albanians and 
1.81% Bosniacs.
Vrbovsko is a town and a municipality in western Croatia, situated at the 
far east of the mountainous region of Gorski Kotar in the Primorje-Gorski Kotar 
County. On its 280 square kilometers area, Vrbovsko features 60 settlements and 
6,047 inhabitants. The town population consists mostly of Croats (55.8% in 1991, 
and 57.2 in 2001) and Serbs (34% in 1991, and 36.2% in 2001). There was no 
change in the demographic composition here in the critical period of time; both 
populations have even increased slightly.
Daruvar is a town located in the western part of the Croatian plains (Moslavi-
na). According to the census of 2001, the population of the Daruvar municipal-
ity (township) was 13,243. In ethnic terms, 58.36% were Croats, 18.91% Czechs, 
14.07% Serbs and 1.05% Hungarians. As for religion, 74.5% are Catholics, 12.7% 
Orthodox, 10.5% agnostics and atheist, while the rest belong to the Baptist Church, 
Islam, Calvinism, and other. The entire area is actually bilingual with Czech being 
the second official language. Daruvar was briefly captured by militants from the 
Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Western Slavonia during the war.
Gospić is a town in the mountainous and sparsely populated region of Lika. 
According to the census in 1991, the population of the Gospić municipality was 
28,010. Ethnically speaking, about 63% were Croats, and some 32% were Serbs. In 
2001 the area of Gospić was populated by 12,980 inhabitants. Nowadays the ethnic 
structure has changed essentially, now being 93% Croats and only 4.85% Serbs. 
In the 1990s, during the course of war in Croatia, the town was held by Croatian 
government forces, while the rebel Serb forces of the Republic of Serbian Krajina 
occupied positions directly to the east and often bombarded the town from there. 
Control of the area finally devolved to the Croatian government after the Croatian 
military operations in August 1995.
Plaški is situated in the lower part of the Ogulin-Plaški Valley. Together with 
Gorski Kotar and Lika, the Ogulin-Plaški Valley forms Mountainous Croatia. Be-
fore the war in Croatia, Plaški was a municipality with a majority of Serb popula-
tion (about 93%). In the census in 2001, Plaški had a municipality population of 
2,292, of which 48.4% were Croats, and 46.1% Serbs. The Croat population were 
mostly those colonized from Bosnia in 1995 after many Serbian civilians had to 
leave during the Croatian military operations in 1995. Today, the municipality of 
Plaški again has a Serb majority due to the return of Serb refugees to their home-
land. The Serbs constitute 67.69% and Croats 28.95% of the population. In the last 
local elections in 2005, the Serb candidates won an overwhelming majority.
Pakrac is a town in western Slavonia, Croatia, with a population of 4,772. 
The municipality population used to be 8,855 (census 2001). The Pakrac area is 
nationally mixed, which is a heritage of the Austria-Hungarian Empire when mem-
bers of different groups from various parts of the Monarchy settled there: Czechs, 
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Hungarians, Germans and Italians. The Serbs were settled mostly after 1945 and 
they were the major group before 1990. The majority of the Serbs had to leave 
the area after the Croatian military operation coded “Flash”. Nowadays Croatians 
represent the absolute majority of the population (68.3%), while the members of 
ethnic minorities consist of 30% in ethnic structure (Serbs 17.1%, Italians 6.3%, 
and Czechs 3.0%).
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U radu se polazi od konstruktivističkih teorijskih pretpostavki prema kojima et-
ničnost i etnički identiteti nisu na jednoznačni način povezani s društvenim sku-
pinama (Brubaker). Promatrano u perspektivi događaja iz devedesetih godina 20. 
stoljeća, u istraživanju se razlikuju dvije osnovne vrste multietničkih područja 
u Hrvatskoj: (a) područja u kojima su eskalirali sukobi do razine raspada svih 
oblika zajedničkog života – »zone sukoba«; (b) područja u kojima su radikalni 
sukobi izbjegnuti, a međuetnički suživot u najvećoj mjeri sačuvan – »područja 
mira«. Anketno istraživanje čiji su rezultati obuhvaćeni ovim radom provede-
no je tijekom listopada 2008. godine u lokalnim zajednicama koje se uklapaju 
u koncept »područja sukoba« (Gospić, Plaški, Pakrac) te u »enklavama mira«: 
Rovinj, Vrbovsko i Daruvar. Osim toga, korištene su i kvalitativne metode priku-
pljanja podataka i analize. Glavni cilj rada je u nastojanju da se pruže odgovori 
na bitna pitanja koja se tiču procesa identifikacije, održavanja grupnih granica i 
etničke distance u višeetničkim sredinama. Na temelju dosad provedenih istraži-
vanja treba pretpostaviti da na ove procese utječu kako događaji iz bliže i dalje 
prošlosti, tako i »međuigra« aktualnih sistemskih čimbenika i aktera mira i su-
koba. Unatoč tomu, rezultati provedenog istraživanja upućuju na ključnu ulogu 
instrumentalizacije etničnosti u procesima konstrukcije grupnih granica, a time i 
u dinamici etničke mobilizacije, sukoba te etničkog mira.
Ključne riječi: višeetnička područja, etnički sukob, etnički mir, etnička distanca, 
grupna zatvorenost
